

Course Manual: Collective Action and Interest Groups

Course Catalogue Number

7324A119IY

Credits

9

Entry requirements

Admission to the master Political Science

Instruction language

English

Time Period

2017-2018, semester 1, block 2 and 3

Location

See: <https://www.roosters.uva.nl/>

Tuesday, 11-13h, REC B3.04

Friday, 9-11h, REC B3.03

Lecturer(s)

Joost Berkhout, office REC B10.10

For contact information, see: <http://www.uva.nl/over-de-uva/organisatie/medewerkers/content/b/e/d.j.berkhout/d.j.berkhout.html>

Course Objectives

After this course, students:

- are familiar with the classic theories and contemporary research in the field of social movement studies and interest group politics.
- are aware of the various contextual factors that shape collective action and explain differences in interest representation between interests, countries, issues and organizational types.
- have practiced their argumentative, research design and other academic skills in writing and through in-class participation.

Course Content

An important part of politics occurs ‘at the gates of’ formal decision-making arena’s: business lobbying on transatlantic trade arrangements (TTIP), student protests for better academic education, international aid provision in the aftermath of natural disasters or ad-hoc, collective support actions for undocumented migrants. These are examples of social movement action and interest group politics. Social movements and interest groups thrive better under some circumstances than under others: we know that some interests do not get organized at all, some collective action organizations do not manage to produce any meaningful political voice and some political campaigns are ‘like a tree falling unheard in a forest’. These differences potentially create inequalities in the political voice of groups in society and in the interests represented before government, as famously stated by Schattschneider (1960), ‘organization is the mobilization of bias’. In this course, we assess several explanations for such differences in the mobilization of social movements, the organization of civil society and the representation of interests before government.

Students will become familiar with the classic theories and contemporary research in the field of social movement studies and interest group politics. The change-oriented collective social movement mobilization of citizens is commonly studied separately from the organized representation of business, professional or citizen interests in interest groups. The integrated treatment in this course allows us to evaluate how social movements (sometimes) become institutionalized, how collective action problems affect both types of organizations and how counter-mobilization or collaboration shapes the number and types of actors

involved on a given issue. We attend to the political scientific study of a broad range of organizational types: social movements, civil society organizations, non-governmental organizations, interest groups, think tanks, business interest associations, lobby groups, individual companies and so on. These organizations are studied in diverse contexts: in local, national, and international arenas, on multiple issues or domains, and in comparative perspective.

The course is of interest to students of political economy and international relations. The final paper assignment allows students to choose a subject that matches their specialized interests and practise skills needed for the MA thesis.

Teaching methods/learning formats

Bi-weekly meetings with in-class assignments and several written assignments.

Course Evaluations & Adjustments of the Course

Several relatively small changes have been made in the 2016-2017 version, most notably the heavier weighting of the literature/case assignment. For this 2017-2018, a couple of additional minor changes have been made, most notably in hosting a larger number of guests during the seminar meetings and a somewhat stronger focus on interest groups compared to social movements.

Manner & Form of Assessment and Assessment Requirements & Criteria

- Students are expected to participate in accordance to Teaching and Examination Regulations of the Graduate School of Social Sciences, article B3.3.
 - Students prepare and present specific in-class (group) assignments.
 - In groups: students chair one of the meetings per week
- Case assignment (40%)
 - Prior to meeting, prepare literature in advance
 - Deadlines: first meeting of even weeks (2, 4, 6, 8).
 - **Three** (out of four) times 750 (min) to 1250 (max) words
- Literature review of required and additional readings and on the topic of the final paper (10%)
 - Make sure to identify paper topic / idea by the end of November
 - 1500 to 2000 words, including research question
 - Deadline: 11 December, 12h in the afternoon (plan well in relation to literature/case assignment)
- Final paper (50%)
 - Around 5000 words (literature review may be revised and reused in the final paper).
 - Deadline: The last Monday of block 3, 12h in the afternoon.
 - Deadline of reparation in case of grade lower than 5,4: one week after receiving feedback.

All written assignments should conform to the formatting as outlined in the Thesis Manual (see: <http://student.uva.nl/mpolsc/az/content2/thesis/thesis-crg-pol.html>)

Specification of assignments:

Chairing session:

In a group of around four students, you prepare and chair the first or second half of a meeting. You will come up with a set-up of the meeting in which your co-students will have an active role. A schedule is made during the first meeting. You discuss your ideas of this prior to the meeting with the teacher. Set-ups include but are not limited to:

Think tank or other role-playing set-up: The think tank concept is based on the idea that students need to find a solution, or reach a consensus, with regard to certain problems or issues, together. Within the think tank concept the focus lies on finding creative solutions and/or novel ways to reach a consensus. The think tank exercise could be made more lively and interesting if it involves deliberations in a role-playing form (Government organizations, multinationals, etc.). Prepare a present a consensus or solution on the topic of the week.

Research design group practice: The seminar could be divided in the amount of groups corresponding with the amount of readings for the session; each group could identify an empirical or theoretical controversy in the reading assigned that remains unresolved. Each group proposes a research design that could help resolve the controversy. Each group prepares a short elevator pitch on the design and one group-member swaps groups so as to give the pitch to a different group. After the pitches are finished, each group develops comments for improving the design, and presents these in class. The group developing the research design then gets a chance to respond. Students develop an understanding of the topic; practice in thinking about new research endeavors, and in exchanging views on research ideas. Prepare draft research designs for discussion.

Inner circle, outer circle: 4 to 6 students are asked to sit inside the normal circle of tables and for five minutes discuss a thesis designed by the teacher that pertains to the literature of the session while the other students listen in. The students debate this thesis, and the outside circle of students have to weigh in, adding issues and views they have not heard yet, and stating their preference for particular views discussed by the inner circle of students. Prepare inner circle discussion.

Literature / case assignments: three out of four

In general: This assignment helps you prepare for the meetings; the deadline is therefore prior to the meeting where the topics are discussed. Focus on the literature of the relevant weeks: these are those of the week of the deadline and the preceding week. Choose one or two questions, arguments, findings or normative positions from the literature studied – this may be a very central point or something that surprised you or attracted your interest. It must be something that reoccurs in more than a single study and find suggestion below. Explain the point selected and explain the differences and similarities among the authors studied. Relate this to a case. You may add your own perspective or question or refer to the class discussions. Case suggestions and weeks themes:

- Week 1 and 2 (deadline first meeting week 2): Case suggestions:
 - Patronage: select from organizations listed as charities: see <http://www.cbf.nl/> (NL), <https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/charity-commission> (UK) or <http://www.guidestar.org/NonprofitDirectory.aspx> (US). Or from organizations receiving government subsidies, e.g. in the EU case listed in: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/fts/index_en.htm
 - Non-joining: any of the organizations mentioned by Jordan and Maloney, or similar ones in other countries.
 - Connective action: select from recent protest events, such as those organized by [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anonymous_\(group\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anonymous_(group)) , <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MoveOn.org> , or various smaller movements.
- Week 3 and 4 (deadline first meeting week 4):
 - Make use of the CIG dataset presented by Jens van de Ploeg in week 3 (or other relevant data made available).
 - Institutionalisation: recent dynamic of any of the movements discussed by Kriesi et al., contemporary organizations which were established as part of recent protests such as those associated with ‘Rethink UvA’, the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, M-15 anti-austerity movement in Spain (also similar movements in Greece, Ireland, Portugal etc), etc
 - Manipulating ‘supply’: (online) marketing techniques of any major citizen group may be chosen, e.g. in the field of environmental politics: WWF, Greenpeace, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, Natuurmonumenten, and organizational members of the EEB (<http://www.eeb.org/index.cfm/members/>).
 - Relationship between membership and non-membership groups: any of the examples mentioned in the article or from the [dataset](#) they use (or similar datasets, such as those of the [Comparative National Associations Project](#) (Johnson, E. W. (2013). Toward international comparative research on associational activity: Variation in the form and focus of voluntary associations in four nations. *Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly*))
- Week 5 and 6 (deadline first meeting week 6):
 - Corporate political activities: select a company from the [Forbes 2000](#) and assess its political activity on the basis of news reports (e.g. search newspapers in [LexisNexis](#)) or based on its website / other sources.

- Disadvantaged groups or issues: identify a relevant ‘disadvantaged’ group (Strolovitch) or issue (Borang and Naurin)
- Business bias: Within business (compare economic sectors) or business community versus citizens (e.g. on the basis of minutes or statements of consultation or parliamentary committee hearings: e.g. available via the Tweede Kamer website (select ‘hoorzittingen en ronde tafel gesprekken), the website of the UK houses of parliament (search Bill committee), for more info see: Helboe Pedersen, H., Halpin, D., & Rasmussen, A. (2015). Who gives evidence to parliamentary committees? A comparative investigation of parliamentary committees and their constituencies. *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, 21(3), 408-427).
- Week 7 and 8 (deadline first meeting week 8)
 - Inside-outside: Examine the media appearances of lobbyists appearing in any parliamentary or government sources(see suggestions above).
 - Influence: relate media reports on lobbying to findings of academic research

Literature review

Think of this as the first part of a research paper on a specific research question, and more specifically, the first part of your final paper for this course. Start with an introduction of around 400 words in which you provide a clear statement of the ‘Why’ question motivating your research and justify the question: Why should we be interested theoretically, normatively or substantively? Subsequently, identify the literatures bearing on answering the ‘why’ question you have posed, summarize and critique each in terms of method and major findings and identify why there is a gap in the literature necessitating your paper. This totals between 1500 and 2000 words.

You may add a brief note in which you provide a brief section outline of the final paper. The section outline is not graded but can be discussed in the individual feedback meeting early December.

Final paper

Students are expected to write an academic paper of around 5000 words (text body) on one of the central topics of the course. Consider using one of the datasets presented or discussed by guests. More detailed instructions are provided on Blackboard / in class.

In case of a grade lower than 5,4, students are allowed to repair their paper based on the feedback. The maximum grade of the repaired version is 6,5.

Inspection of exams/assignments, feedback

Students receive written feedback on the literature assignments and final paper. There are individual feedback meetings on the literature review and, on request, on the final paper.

Rules regarding Fraud and Plagiarism

The provisions of the Regulations Governing Fraud and Plagiarism for UvA Students apply in full (except the rules regarding self-plagiarism when it comes to reusing the literature review text in the final paper).

Access this regulation at <http://www.student.uva.nl/preventfraud-plagiarism>

Literature/materials

See references in the programme. All articles are available online (through the UvA network). Please refer to Blackboard for further availability

Date Final Grade

Simultaneous with the final paper grade.

Programme description per week

Mobilisation bias: The logic of collective action (week 1 and 2):

In week 1, we evaluate a crucial phase in the development of political science, more specifically the clash between the pluralists of the Fifties and their critics in the Sixties, and the pivotal place of the study of collective action (groups and movements) in that clash. The pluralist 'group approach' is dominant in American political science in the Fifties, but is seriously challenged on normative, empirical and conceptual grounds (Lowery and Brasher, 2003 (chapter 1) and in additional readings: Baumgartner and Leech, 1998, 44-63). Central in this respect is the publication of Olson's *Logic of Collective Action* (1965) which fundamentally changed the study of groups and movements. As noted by Oliver (1993, 273-274). Also see Baumgartner and Leech, 1998, 63-82), prior to 1965 social scientists assumed mobilisation to be 'natural' and studied the implications of group behavior, whereas post-1965, 'they assume that collective inaction is natural even in the face of common interests, and that it is collective action that needs to be explained'. And this, in turn, produced a new generation of researchers challenging Olson's *Logic*. We read the first two chapters of a textbook on this topic and we study an excerpted, summarised version of the Olson's book.

In the additional readings, you will find an outline of formal sociological theories of collective action with specific formal critique of Olson (Oliver, 1993). Furthermore, as discussed in Lowery and Brasher (2003, 37 and further) Wilson and Salisbury, respectively, add expressive of solidary incentives that individuals may have when joining groups to the 'material incentive' structure of propagated by Olson (Salisbury, 1969; Wilson, 1974). Baumgartner and Leech (1998, 44-82) provide further details on the debates between pluralists and critics, and Olson and critics. After this week you are able to take a thoughtful position on the following proposition:

Collective action only occurs in small groups with concentrated interests

In week 2 we look at studies that challenge parts of Olson's *Logic*. To start, Walker (1983), Hansen et al (2005) and Jordan and Maloney (2006) explicitly challenge Olson on specific empirical grounds. In a much-cited research article, Walker (1983) points at the critical role of patronage in collective action. Jordan and Maloney (2006) examine whether 'non-joiners' have 'rationally' chosen to free ride, or whether they are just sceptical about the likely success of collective action. Furthermore, recent studies, most notably Bennett and Segerberg (2012) have revived some of Olson's notions in order to assess collective action through social media. Traditional 'organized' collective action presumably has higher barriers than the 'connective' action coordinated through various new media (Twitter, Facebook, sms, and so). De Bruyker and his co-authors identify an important difference between business and non-business interest groups regarding the implications of collective action problems when interest group engage in lobbying.

In the additional readings Bimber et al (2005) also theoretically revive the logic of collective action and specify how new technology can sometimes overcome collective action problems. Lowery et al (2005)

situate the *Logic* within the context of studies of communities of interest groups and highlight that systems of interest groups must be understood as shaped by both societal ‘bottom-up’ factors, such as those indicated by Olson, and ‘top-down’ factors related to politics and inter-organizational dynamics. Lohmann (2003) identifies the imperfect or incomplete nature of the information that individuals have about their own interests, and, hence, their (collectively detrimental) tendency to defend their own interests better than collective interests. Heckelman (2007) discusses the ‘other’ book by Olson: ‘The Rise and Decline of Nations’ (1982) in which Olson stipulates the implications of his *Logic*. Olson’s point is that narrowly interested businesses pressure governments in such a manner that it produces deadlock in policymaking at the expense of the general interest, which eventually lead to economic decline. His concern is about economic inefficiency rather than political equality. After this week you are able to take a thoughtful position on the following proposition:

Collective action potentially occurs on any interest shared by more than one person or organization

Participation bias: social movement participation (week 3) and the professionalization and institutionalisation of movements (week 4)

In week 3 and 4 we continue to focus on the relationship between citizens and groups or movements. We focus on personal, participatory resources, organizational resources and maintenance of organizations as groups professionalise over time. We no longer explicitly employ the Olsonian terminology.

In week 3 Brady et al (1995) and Marien et al (2010) depart from an individual participation perspective. Both groups of researchers try to find out which citizens are more likely to participate politically, especially in a ‘non-institutional’ manner, such as through social movement participation or interest group membership. Both highlight that richer, more educated persons are more likely to participate politically, but also point at several additional characteristics such as civic skills and gender. Edwards and McCarthy (2004) review the field of study into the ways in which these ‘inequalities’ translate into actual patterns of social movement organizations. In their words, ‘middle-class groups remain privileged in their access to many kinds of resources, and, therefore, not surprisingly social movements that resonate with the concerns of relatively privileged social groups predominate (...) Resource mobilization theory is at root aimed at better understanding how groups are able to overcome prevailing patterns of resource inequality in their efforts to pursue social change goals.’ Hanegraaff et al (2017) examine the demographic structure of interest group membership on the dimensions on which one should expect substantial differences (education, gender, ethnicity). Their findings pessimistically show important inequalities in the constituencies of interest groups, but, more optimistically, indicate that this is not additionally stimulated by ‘politically savvy’ organizational focus of organizations representing relatively advantaged groups. The CIG dataset used by these researchers is available for use in the final paper (and other assignments).

The additional readings study individual participation in social movements (Walgrave and Klandermans, 2010) and in voluntary organization and interest groups (Schlozman et al 2012). In explaining the strength

of certain movements, Kriesi and his co-authors (1995) prioritise the political process (political opportunity structure) rather than efforts (resource mobilization theory) on the part of social movements. After this week you are able to take a thoughtful position on the following proposition:

Interest groups (and social movements) tend to voice the concerns of the socio-economically privileged

In week 4 we focus on the form of participation offered by social movements, interest groups and civil society groups more broadly. The central concern here is that as social movements institutionalise and professionalise they become increasingly 'bureaucratic' and distant from their supporters-base. And consequently 'drift' away from actual representation of the causes and interests on which they mobilised in the first place, and with only 'check-book' participation rather than offering opportunities for the development of civic skills. The required reading report findings of empirical research. Kriesi (1996) presents an elegant typology of the organisational context and organisational adaptation of social movements. He assesses the circumstances under which certain types of social movement change (radicalisation, institutionalisation, devolution, commercialisation) occur. Klüber and Saurugger (2013) study professionalization in the EU context. Jordan and Maloney (1998) point out that individuals have a broad range of interests and preferences, some of which they may not even be aware of, and consequently are potentially willing to support various causes. This produces the situation that citizens eventually end up supporting causes on which professional organizations put forward sophisticated political marketing strategies. In other words, the 'supply' of groups matters more than the actual 'demand' on the part of citizens; something that is unlikely to lead to something that comes close to unbiased interest representation. Walker et al (2011) empirically assess the 'the decline of traditional membership organizations and their replacement by professional advocates', motivated by the concern that this is 'related to the decline in civic capacity'. They optimistically conclude that traditional membership organizations and non-membership professional advocates co-exist in a largely mutually beneficial manner.

In the additional readings, Sanchez-Salgado (2014), Klüber and Saurugger (2013) and Kohler-Koch and Buth (2013) assess the relationship between professionalism and 'grass-roots'-membership in the EU case. Rucht (1999) examines the so-called 'Iron law of oligarchy', the notion that every political organization over time tends to moderate politically and develop stronger hierarchy. Maloney (2015) discusses recent literature on this topic and relates it to 'democratic delivery'. Van der Heijden (1997) adds a case to the Kriesi (1996) framework. After this week you are able to take a thoughtful position on the following proposition:

Professionalization diversifies the 'supply' of movements and interest groups

Organization bias: is interest representation 'skewed, loaded and unbalanced in favor of a fraction of a minority' ? (week 5 and 6)

For the remainder of these weeks, we depart from another 'classic' text in this field of study:

Schattschneider's *The Semisovereign People*. Similar to Olson, his work is a response to the pluralist group approach of the Fifties but in contrast to Olson, his study is less formal and more normative. His key point

is that the interests represented through the ‘pressure system’, compared to party system, are very narrow in scope and biased in favour of the ‘upper-class’. ‘Public’ or general interests are not represented, nor do disadvantaged interests, ie those without ‘resources’, gain voice through interest groups. This argument has resonated strongly in subsequent empirical studies in the field, of which Schlozman et al (2012) is a recent example. More conceptually, as outlined in Lowery et al (2015), Schattschneider’s work also raised the question what an ‘unbiased interest community’ would look like. In the discussion note by Lowery et al (2015), several scholars suggest distinct criteria that potentially indicate the extent to which interest communities are ‘biased’. We look at bias in, first, issue priorities of advocates, and, second, the strength of business interest representation compared to others, and within the business lobbying community. Strolovitch (2006) focusses on sub-groups within organizations advocating on behalf of the disadvantaged. While Schattschneider argues that interests of the disadvantaged are underrepresented in general, Strolovitch further problematizes this, when she finds that in cases where disadvantaged have organized a voice such as in the National Organization for Women, these mainly focus on issues of concern to relatively privileged constituents of the group. Kimball et al (2012) examine the issues represented by Washington lobbyists and evaluate the extent to which these match the issue concerns of different segments of the public. They find ‘evidence that the lobbying agenda does not reflect the policy priorities of the public’.

As regards business interest representation (week 6), Rasmussen and Carroll (2013) and Berkhout et al (2015) study the EU case. Rasmussen and Carroll (2013) deal with bias towards business interest representation, both in terms of actual numbers and lobby activities. They find ‘very obvious’ aggregate numerical business dominance, with even stronger dominance when looking at the lobby on EU consultations. Especially regulatory proposals in which the costs are concentrated lead to a ‘biased’ pro-business mobilization of interests. Berkhout et al (2015) examine the contours of the business lobby in Brussels and find that economic, structural factors explain the variation in the numbers of lobbyists per economic sector, rather than the nature or impact of EU policy making (also see [LSE weblog](#)). Hart (2004), Hojnacki et al (2015) and Aizenberg and Hanegraaff (2017) identify the theoretical, normative and empirical challenges involved in the study of corporate political activities.

Regarding the additional readings, Hansen et al (2005) examine collective and individual political action on the part of firms and point out that firms seek from government very specific benefits such as contracts or regulatory exemptions. This motivates them to lobby and, not foreseen by Olson, their particular interests spills over into collective action. The two articles by Lowery and co-authors review the arguments on bias (2004) and point to empirical mechanisms underlying bias in interest representation (2005). After this week you are able to take a thoughtful position on the following proposition:

The distribution of interests in society is unrelated to the distribution of interests in before government

Access bias: do public, lobby and mobilisation strategies add up or exclude each other?

(week 7)

One of the central assumptions in interest group studies is that business interests tend to choose an ‘inside’ lobby strategy aimed at policy makers and that ‘public’ interest groups and social movements tend to ‘go public’ to promote their cause. This is studied from various angles in the required readings of this week. Dur and Mateo (2013) present a country comparative study and find systematic evidence that ‘group type’ explains strategies. Binderkrantz et al (2015) focus on Denmark and look at a more aggregate level when they compare arenas rather than groups. They find support for the idea that there is ‘cumulative inequality’ in the access of groups to different arenas; those who have a dominant position ‘inside’ government, also have that in the media. Keck and Sikkink (1999), in a hypothesis similar to the arena-shifting argument by Binderkrantz et al (2015) open up the possibility of ‘losers’ of national conflicts to seek redress at the international level, therewith creating ‘boomrang’ effect.

In the additional readings, both Fraussen and Wouter (2015 and Weiler and Brandli’s (2015) take up a similar question as Dur and Mateo. Mahoney and Baumgartner (2015) look at the US case and point to the importance of the structure of the policy conflict in explaining favourable treatment by government officials. Beyers and Kerremans (2007) highlight the organizational constraints of interest organizations when ‘shopping’ at different levels of government, in their case of ‘domestic’ groups becoming active at the European level. Hanegraaff et al extend the work of Beyers and Kerremans (2007) in the context of lobbying at the WTO conferences. After this week you are able to take a thoughtful position on the following proposition:

Groups with limited access to policy-makers may gain easier access to the news media than others

Influence bias: Are business interest organizations more successful than others? (week 8)

As noted in week 5, Schattschneider (1960) assumes that bias in the pattern of interest representation largely resembles bias in the political agenda and in political decisions. In this week we focus on the ‘dirty little secret’ of interest group studies: the systematic research finding that lobbying tends to be ineffective in influencing public policy. In his well-argued literature review, Lowery (2013) lists the reasons why this may be the case – ranging from the research challenges of defining and measuring influence to the idea that interest groups most of the time are not aiming at influencing policy makers, but pursue other goals. The empirical studies of Dür et al (2015) and Woll (2007) assess the success of business actors in the EU and in international trade negotiations, respectively. Dür et al (2015) note that ‘business routinely faces a defensive battle’ in the EU and tend to be unsuccessful in pushing the European Commission in the direction they prefer, especially on relatively conflictual issues on which also the EP is involved. A similar conclusion is reached by Klüver (2013). Woll (2007) develops the relational dimension of power and consequently focusses more specifically on the interests, preferences and power of government actors – which sometimes structurally favors business actors. This is important, and noted in a simplifying manner by Lowery, (2013,

5): 'If I am hungry and a colleague asks me to go to lunch, my colleague's influence on me is only of a very trivial sort'.

In the additional readings, Amenta and Caren (2004) discuss the 'influence' or 'outcomes' of social movement activities. Rasmussen (2015) assess influence in the EU case qualitative manner. Gilens and Page (2014) US study explicitly links influence to affluence, and received popular attention in the [Daily Show](#). After this week you are able to take a thoughtful position on the following proposition:

Interest groups lobby for other purposes than influencing public policy

Programme: readings per week

Additional readings are listed as recommendations for those planning to write the final paper on the theme of the week and those with chairing responsibilities in that week. The readings are specified per day but are also related to each other per week, make sure to study them in an accumulated way (i.e. Tuesday's literature may also be discussed on Friday). There will be a number of guests throughout the course: van der Ploeg (week 3), Broer (week 4), Statsch (week 5), Aizenberg (week 6), van Rooij (week 7) and probably more. This implies that we will now and then deviate somewhat from the programme stated below (ie sometimes the discussion of literature will be brought forward or delayed).

Week	Theme	Dates	Literature (when not alphabetically: listed in suggested reading order)
1 (30-10)	Introduction & The logic of collective action: theory and disciplinary history	Tuesday	Lowery, D. & Brasher, H. (2003) <i>Organized Interests and American Government</i> , McGraw-Hill, Boston. Ch1, especially table 1-2 on page 18. PDF
		Friday	Olson, M. (1993) 'The Logic of Collective Action. Richardson, J.J. (ed) <i>Pressure Groups</i> . , Oxford University Press, USA: 23-37. PDF Lowery, D. & Brasher, H. (2003) <i>Organized Interests and American Government</i> , McGraw-Hill, Boston. Ch2, especially the section headed 'sidestepping the logic', PDF
			Additional: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baumgartner, F.R. & Leech, B.L. (1998) <i>Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science</i>, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J. 44-82, Chapter 3 • Oliver, P. E. (1993). Formal models of collective action. <i>Annual Review of Sociology</i>, 271-300. • Salisbury, R. H. (1969). An exchange theory of interest groups. <i>Midwest Journal of Political Science</i>, 13(1), 1-32. • Wilson, J.Q. (1974) <i>Political Organizations</i>, Basic Books, New York. 30-55 PDF
2 (6-11)	The logic of collective action: Olson's implications, recent studies and new technology	Tuesday	Jordan, G., & Maloney, W. (2006). "Letting George Do It": Does Olson Explain Low Levels of Participation?. <i>Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties</i> , 16(2), 115-139. Bennett, W.L. & Segerberg, A. (2012) The Logic of Connective Action. <i>Information, Communication & Society</i> , 15(5): 739-768.
		Friday	Walker, J. L. (1983). The origins and maintenance of interest groups in America. <i>American Political Science Review</i> , 77(02), 390-406. De Bruyker, I., J. Berkhout, M. Hanegraaff, (2017) The paradox of collective action, <i>Working Paper University of Amsterdam</i>

			<p>Additional:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bimber, B., Flanagan, A.J. & Stohl, C. (2005) Reconceptualizing Collective Action in the Contemporary Media Environment. <i>Communication Theory</i>, 15(4): 365-388. • Lohmann, S. (2003). Representative government and special interest politics (We have met the enemy and he is us). <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i>, 15(3), 299-319. • Lowery, D., Gray, V. & Monogan, J. (2008) The Construction of Interest Communities: Distinguishing Bottom-Up and Top-Down Models. <i>Journal of Politics</i>, 70(4): 1160-1176. • Jordan, G., & Maloney, W. A. (1996). How Bumble-bees Fly: Accounting for Public Interest Participation. <i>Political Studies</i>, 44(4), 668-685. • Olson, M. (1982). <i>The rise and decline of nations</i>. New Haven: Yale University Press. See review: Heckelman, J. C. (2007). Explaining the Rain: "The Rise and Decline of Nations" after 25 Years. <i>Southern Economic Journal</i>, 18-33.
3 (13-11)	Participation bias? Social movement participation and mobilization	Tuesday	<p>Brady, H. E., Verba, S., & Schlozman, K. L. (1995). Beyond SES: A resource model of political participation. <i>American Political Science Review</i>, 89(02), 271-294.</p> <p>Marien, S., Hooghe, M., & Quintelier, E. (2010). Inequalities in Non-institutionalised Forms of Political Participation: A Multi-level Analysis of 25 countries. <i>Political Studies</i>, 58(1), 187-213.</p>
		Friday	<p>Edwards, B. & McCarthy, J.D. (2004) Resources and Social Movement Mobilisation. Snow, D.A., S.A. Soule and H. Kriesi (eds) <i>The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements</i>. , Blackwell, Malden: 116-152. See chapter in ebook</p> <p>Hanegraaff, M., J. Berkhout & J. van der Ploeg, (2017) 'Who is represented? Exploring the demographic structure of interest group membership.' paper prepared for presentation at the General Conference of the ECPR, Oslo</p>
			<p>Additional:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Walgrave, S. and D. Rucht (eds) <i>The World Say no to War</i>. , University of Minnesota Press: 169-192. • Schlozman, K. L., Verba, S., & Brady, H. E. (2012). <i>The unheavenly chorus: Unequal political voice and the broken promise of American democracy</i>. Princeton University Press. Part II Available as E-book • Snow, D.A., S.A. Soule and H. Kriesi (eds) <i>The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements</i>. , Blackwell, Malden: all chapters provide useful literature reviews, for political opportunity structure theory see chapter by Kriesi. Available as ebook in the library • Kriesi, H., Koopmans, R., Duyvendak, J. W., & Giugni, M. (1992). New social movements and political opportunities in western Europe. <i>European Journal of Political Research</i>, 22(2), 219-244. & Van der Heijden, H. A. (1997). Political opportunity structure and the institutionalisation of the environmental movement. <i>Environmental politics</i>, 6(4), 25-50.

4 (20-11)	Institutionalisation and professionalization	Tuesday	<p>Kriesi, H. (1996) The Organizational Structure of New Social Movements in a Political Context. McAdam, D., J.D. McCarthy and M.N. Zald (eds) <i>Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements. Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings.</i>, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge: 152-184. PDF</p> <p>Klüver, H., & Saurugger, S. (2013). Opening the black box: The professionalization of interest groups in the European Union. <i>Interest Groups & Advocacy</i>, 2(2), 185-205.</p>
		Friday	<p>Jordan, G., & Maloney, W. A. (1998). Manipulating membership: supply-side influences on group size. <i>British Journal of Political Science</i>, 28(2), 389-409.</p> <p>Walker, E.T., McCarthy, John D. & Baumgartner, F. (2011) Replacing Members with Managers? Mutualism among Membership and Nonmembership Advocacy Organizations in the United States. <i>American Journal of Sociology</i>, 116(4): 1284-1337.</p>
			<p>Additional:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rucht, D. (1999). Linking organization and mobilization: Michels's Iron law of oligarchy reconsidered. <i>Mobilization: An International Quarterly</i>, 4(2), 151-169. • Sanchez Salgado, R. (2014). Rebalancing EU Interest Representation? Associative Democracy and EU Funding of Civil Society Organizations. <i>JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies</i>, 52(2), 337-353. • Kohler-Koch, Beate and Vanessa Buth (2013). The balancing act of European civil society: Between professionalism and grass roots, in: Beate Kohler-Koch and Christine Quittkat (2013), <i>De-Mystification of Participatory Democracy. EU Governance and Civil Society</i>, Oxford: Oxford University Press: 114-148. (available in the library as E-book) • Maloney, William A. (2015) Organizational Populations: Professionalization, Maintenance and Democratic Delivery, Lowery, D., V. Gray and D. Halpin (eds) <i>The Organization Ecology of Interest Communities: An Assessment and an Agenda.</i>, Palgrave. available in the library as ebook)
5 (27-11)	The mobilisation of bias in interest group politics: issue priorities	Tuesday	<p>Schattschneider, E.E. (1960) <i>The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America</i>, Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, New York. Chapter 2, 3</p> <p>Lowery, D., Baumgartner, F. R., Berkhout, J., Berry, J. M., Halpin, D., Hojnacki, M., Klüver, H., Kohler-Koch, B, Richardson, J., Schlozman, K. L. (2015). Images of an unbiased interest group system. <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i>, 22(8), 1212-1231.</p>
		Friday	<p>Strolovitch, Dara Z. 2006. "Do Interest Groups Represent the Disadvantaged? Advocacy at the Intersections of Race, Class, and Gender." <i>Journal of Politics</i> 68 (4): 894–910.</p> <p>Kimball, D. C., Baumgartner, F. R., Berry, J. M., Hojnacki, M., & Leech, B. L. (2012). Who cares about the lobbying agenda? <i>Interest Groups & Advocacy</i>, 1(1), 5-25.</p> <p>Statsch, P. and J. Berkhout (2017) 'The fluidity of friends and foes', paper prepared for presentation at the General Conference of the ECPR, Oslo</p>

			<p>Additional:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Baumgartner, F. R. (2010). Interest groups and agendas. In L. S. Maisel, J. M. Berry & G. C. Edwards (Eds.), <i>The oxford handbook of American political parties and interest groups</i> Oxford University Press. See also other chapters on interest groups in this handbook, available as ebook in the library • Boräng, Frida and Daniel Naurin (2016) Lobbying for the people? Measuring substantive representation by interest groups, Prepared for the 10th ECPR General Conference, Prague 7-10 September 2016 • Halpin, Darren R., Fraussen, Bert & Nownes, Anthony J. (2017) The Balancing Act of Establishing a Policy Agenda: Conceptualizing and Measuring Drivers of Issue Prioritization within Interest Groups. <i>Governance</i>, online first • Schlozman, K. L., Verba, S., & Brady, H. E. (2012). <i>The unbeavenly chorus: Unequal political voice and the broken promise of American democracy</i>. Princeton University Press. Part III Available as E-book 263-444, these are a lot of pages: this may be studied superficially as some arguments are repetitions of arguments already studied in previous meetings. Prioritise chapter 11. Similar arguments are presented in: Schlozman et al (2015) Louder Chorus – Same Accent: The Representation of Interests in Pressure Politics, 1981 – 2011, Lowery, D., V. Gray and D. Halpin (eds) <i>The Organization Ecology of Interest Communities: An Assessment and an Agenda</i>. , Palgrave. 157-182 available in the library as ebook
6 (4-12)	The mobilisation of bias in interest group politics: business interests	Tuesday	<p>Berkhout, J., Carroll, B. J., Braun, C., Chalmers, A. W., Destrooper, T., Lowery, D., Otjes, S. & Rasmussen, A. (2015). Interest organizations across economic sectors: explaining interest group density in the European Union. <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i>, 22(4), 462-480.</p> <p>Rasmussen, A. & Carroll, B.J. (2013) Determinants of Upper-Class Dominance in the Heavenly Chorus: Lessons from European Union Online Consultations. <i>British Journal of Political Science</i>, 44(2): 445-459.</p>
			<p>Additional:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Lowery, D. & Gray, V. (2004) Bias in the Heavenly Chorus: Interests in Society and before Government. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i>, 16(1): 5-29. • Lowery, D., Gray, V., & Fellowes, M. (2005). Sisyphus Meets the Borg Economic Scale and Inequalities in Interest Representation. <i>Journal of Theoretical Politics</i>, 17(1), 41-74.
		Friday	<p>Hart, D. M. (2004). " Business" is not an interest group: on the study of companies in American national politics. <i>Annu. Rev. Polit. Sci.</i>, 7, 47-69.</p> <p>Hojnacki, M., Marchetti, K. M., Baumgartner, F. R., Berry, J. M., Kimball, D. C., & Leech, B. L. (2015). Assessing business advantage in Washington lobbying. <i>Interest Groups & Advocacy</i>, 4(3), 205-224.</p> <p>Aizenberg, E. and M. Hanegraaff (2017) Why do corporations lobby alone? paper prepared for presentation at the General Conference of the ECPR, Oslo</p>
			<p>Additional:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Smith, M. A. (2000). <i>American business and political power: Public opinion, elections, and democracy</i>. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. • Streeck, W., Grote, J. R., Schneider, V., & Visser, J. (Eds.). (2006). <i>Governing interests: Business associations facing</i>

			<p><i>internationalization</i>. London, New York: Routledge.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Hansen, W. L., Mitchell, N. J., & Drope, J. M. (2005). The logic of private and collective action. <i>American journal of political science</i>, 49(1), 150-167.
7 (11-12)	Bias in strategies	Tuesday	<p>Dür, A. & Mateo, G. (2013) Gaining Access Or Going Public? Interest Group Strategies in Five European Countries. <i>European Journal of Political Research</i>, 52(5): 660-686.</p> <p>Binderkrantz, A. S., Christiansen, P. M., & Pedersen, H. H. (2015). Interest group access to the bureaucracy, parliament, and the media. <i>Governance</i>, 28(1), 95-112.</p>
		Friday	<p>Keck, M.E. & Sikkink, K. (1999) Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics. <i>International Social Science Journal</i>, 51(159).</p> <p>Hanegraaff, M., Beyers, J., & De Bruycker, I. (2016). Balancing inside and outside lobbying: The political strategies of lobbyists at global diplomatic conferences. <i>European Journal of Political Research</i>.</p>
			<p>Additional:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Beyers, J. & Kerremans, B. (2007) Critical Resource Dependencies and the Europeanization of Domestic Interest Groups. <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i>, 14(3): 460-481. De Bruycker, I. (2015). Pressure and expertise: explaining the information supply of interest groups in EU legislative lobbying. <i>JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies</i>. Fraussen, B., & Wouters, R. (2015). Aandacht trekken of advies verstrekken? de aanwezigheid van middenveldorganisaties in adviesraad- en beeldbuispolitiek. <i>Res Publica</i>, 57(2): 159-184 PDF Hanegraaff, M., Braun, C., De Bièvre, D., & Beyers, J. (2015) The Domestic and Global Origins of Transnational Advocacy Explaining Lobbying Presence during WTO Ministerial Conferences. <i>Comparative Political Studies</i> 48 (12) 1591-1621 Mahoney, C., & Baumgartner, F. R. (2015). Partners in Advocacy: Lobbyists and Government Officials in Washington. <i>The Journal of Politics</i>, 77(1), 202-215. Weiler, F., and Brändli, M. (2015). Inside versus outside lobbying: How the institutional framework shapes the lobbying behaviour of interest groups. <i>European Journal of Political Research</i>
8 (18-12)	Bias in influence	Tuesday	<p>Lowery, D. (2013). Lobbying influence: Meaning, measurement and missing. <i>Interest Groups & Advocacy</i>, 2(1), 1-26.</p> <p>Woll, C. (2007) Leading the Dance? Power and Political Resources of Business Lobbyists. <i>Journal of Public Policy</i>, 27(01): 57-78.</p>
		Friday	<p>Dür, A., Bernhagen, P., & Marshall, D. (2015). Interest Group Success in the European Union When (and Why) Does Business Lose?. <i>Comparative Political Studies</i>, 48 (8) 951-983 including discussion via weblog</p> <p>Klüver, H. (2013). Lobbying as a collective enterprise: winners and losers of policy formulation in the European Union. <i>Journal of European Public Policy</i>, 20(1), 59-76.</p>

			<p>Additional:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Rasmussen, M. K. (2015). The battle for influence: the politics of business lobbying in the European Parliament. <i>JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies</i>, 53(2), 365-382. • Gilens, M., & Page, B. I. (2014). Testing theories of American politics: Elites, interest groups, and average citizens. <i>Perspectives on politics</i>, 12(03), 564-581.
	Paper writing and office hours	January	Please make use of office hours for paper questions (see Blackboard)

Additional readings: books:

Student may want to use any of these books for their final paper.

- Baumgartner, F., Berry, J.M., Hojnacki, M., Kimball, D. & Leech, B. (2009) *Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses and Why*, Chicago University Press, Chicago.
 - o According to *Perspectives on Politics* 'the most important book on lobbying and interest group influence in at least a generation'. Focus on US Congress cases between 1998-2002. Especially of interest to (public policy) students interested in the 'status-quo bias' of political institutions. More info on:
<http://www.unc.edu/~fbaum/books/lobby/lobbying.htm>
- Bob, C. (2005). *The marketing of rebellion: Insurgents, media, and international activism*. Cambridge University Press.
 - o The central thesis of this book is that attention and 'Western' support goes to the 'savviest and not the neediest' Third World political movements. Includes case studies of the 'marketing strategies' of Mexico's Zapatista rebels and Nigeria's Ogoni ethnic group. These case may be of special interest to International Relations students but last year the book proved to be popular among students of all tracks.
- Schlozman, K. L., Verba, S., & Brady, H. E. (2012). *The unheavenly chorus: Unequal political voice and the broken promise of American democracy*. Princeton University Press. Available as E-[book](#)
 - o This book documents the data collection of the authors throughout their careers on interest group participation and lobbying. The authors focus on individual participation and interest group activity. Considering the length of the book, the review may disregard section II on individual participation. When it comes to lobbying, the authors note that 'interest group politics facilitates the conversion of market resources into political advocacy'. Especially of interest to students of the Political Theory and Political Behavior track.

Further consider:

- Gilens, Martin, *Affluence and Influence: Economic Inequality and Political Power in America*, Princeton University Press See e-[book](#)
 - o The book focusses on economic inequality and political responsiveness. The US government is dominantly responsive to the well-off and interest group representation seem to exacerbate this effect. Especially of interest to students of the Political Theory and Political Behavior track.
- Halpin, D. (2013) *The Organizational Politics of Interest Groups : Designing Advocacy*, Routledge, [PDF](#)
- Klüver, H. (2013) *Lobbying in the European Union: Interest Groups, Lobbying Coalitions, and Policy Change*, Oxford University Press. [PDF](#)
- Sanchez Salgado, R. (2014) *Europeanizing Civil Society: How the EU Shapes Civil Society Organizations*, Palgrave Macmillan. [PDF](#)
- Tarrow, S. (2012). *Strangers at the gates: movements and states in contentious politics*. Cambridge University Press.
- Van der Heijden, H. A. (2010). *Social movements, public spheres and the European politics of the environment: green power Europe?*. Palgrave Macmillan. [PDF](#)